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The current global ‘crisis’ of the refugee movement has drawn to the forefront longstanding public worries 
about welcoming and accommodating refugees, especially in liberal democratic States. While religion is 
central to refuge, very little is known about the experiences of individuals seeking refugee protection on 
religious grounds and even the racialisation of religious identities within the asylum adjudication system. 
Drawing on ethnographic research with Christians from Pakistan, who are seeking asylum in the United 
Kingdom (UK), this paper explores the religious discrimination that this group faces within the context of 
the UK’s current hostile environment. Findings reveal a complex issue of misdirected Islamophobia, along 
with other multi-layered forms of stereotyping. By exploring and engaging with these issues, the paper 
aims to highlight the complex ‘borders’ that those seeking protection on religious grounds have to 
negotiate as they move through the asylum adjudication system. 
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Introduction 
While Castle, Haas and Miller (2014) have pointed out that the current era is better understood as the ‘age 
of migration’, the global refugee phenomenon has increased exponentially to become one of the worst 
challenges that nation-states face within the twenty-first century. This increased movement of people, 
mainly from the Global South to the Global North, which is often ‘presented as a matter of security’ 
(Bosworth and Guild 2008), has led to the conflation of migration and terrorism. To this end, the major 
concern for contemporary governments and immigration regimes has become that of securing their 
borders and protecting their own citizens, a move that threatens to undermine the international refugee 
protection regime. 
 
In the United Kingdom (UK), as in other liberal democracies, a broadly negative perception towards 
asylum seekers has long dominated public and political discourse. In turn, this has necessitated the 
enactment of evermore stringent policies that aim to distinguish ‘between deserving and undeserving 
foreigners that has blurred the boundaries between so-called “economic” migrants, terrorists, and those 
searching for asylum’ (Bosworth and Guild 2008: 4). 
 
As Cwerner (2004) argues, much of the immigration legislation has incorporated techniques and 
mechanisms by which people are sorted into distinct categories, leading to the production of everyday 
‘borders’—or what Guentner et al. (2016) calls ‘bordering practices’1—within the immigration system. 
Given that asylum decisions are rarely undertaken at the port of entry, Jubany (2017) argues that the 
asylum-screening process represents the core action of a particular border, and it is within this ‘border 
world’ or ‘site’ where immigration officers occupy the dominant position. Therefore, it is important to 
examine the everyday workings of the asylum system, particularly the ways in which immigration officials 
(as representatives of the State) ‘embody and perform their roles’, and how important judgements about 
‘who is and is not deserving of refugee status’ are often made (Jubany 2017: 17). 
 
This paper draws on research from an ‘extreme’ case—that is, the adjudication of faith-based asylum 
claims—using a case study on Christians from the Muslim majority world (particularly Pakistan) seeking 
asylum in the UK. In doing so, the paper highlights issues of potential discrimination, prejudice, harm and 
bias inherent in the adjudication of such claims. It begins with a discussion of Miranda Fricker’s epistemic 
injustice thesis to provide the theoretical framework, followed by a brief description of the research upon 
which the paper is based. It then presents the lived experiences of Pakistani Christians seeking asylum in 
three sections—first, the challenges around proving their Christian identity; second, the problems of 
evidencing their Christian faith; and third, the barriers to evidencing persecution—before concluding. 
 
Theoretical Underpinnings: Epistemic Forms of Injustice 
 
To better understand the politics of asylum in relation to the adjudication of faith-based asylum claims in 
the UK, this paper draws on Miranda Fricker’s philosophical work, particularly her epistemic injustice 
thesis. Fricker’s (2007) research centres on the production of knowledge in social interactions, exploring 
the operation of power in two basic, everyday epistemic practices of conveying knowledge to others and 
making sense of social experiences. As Fricker argues, it is the politics of epistemic practice that determines 
how power is used to produce injustice in everyday social life. This can occur in the form of ‘hermeneutical’ 




For Fricker (2007: 155), hermeneutical injustice entails ‘having some significant area of one’s social 
experience obscured from collective understanding owing to a structural identity prejudice in the 
collective hermeneutical resource’. As Fricker certainly recognises, this happens when negative prejudices 
about particular groups (that cannot participate on an equal basis in creating shared meanings or 
knowledge about their own social experience) are circulated within a culture so as to dominate public 
discourse. Consequently, this defames the epistemic character of the members of that group, affecting how 
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they are generally perceived, treated or listened to, especially when it comes to matters of credibility. Thus, 
as Medina (2011: 72) puts it, hermeneutical injustices may better be seen as resulting from ‘obstacles and 
limitations in the social imaginary’2 that hinder the ‘communicative and epistemic capacities of members 
of certain groups and preclude a genuine understanding of their experiences’. 
 
As such, this paper seeks to show through the experiences of Christian Pakistani asylum seekers how 
Fricker’s account of hermeneutical injustice can facilitate understanding of the structural forms of injustice 
and the related forms of racism and harm that asylum seekers suffer in their everyday pursuit to gain 





While not all testimonial injustices have a hermeneutical background, Fricker (2007) points out that where 
identity prejudice is embedded into the legal, political and administrative structures (as is the situation of 
asylum seekers), marginalised individuals often suffer what she calls ‘systemic testimonial injustice’. This 
is because they enter communicative interactions in a disadvantaged position and are, therefore, more 
likely not to be taken seriously: ‘when hearer prejudice does its work in advance of a potential 
informational exchange: it pre-empts any such exchange’ (Fricker 2007: 130). Consequently, testimonial 
injustice is made manifest ‘when prejudice causes a hearer to give a deflated level of credibility to a 
speaker’s word’ (1)—not only as judged on ‘what they say but also on how they say it’ (26). 
 
To this end, the central harm of testimonial injustice is ‘identity-prejudicial credibility deficit’ (Fricker 
2007: 28). This is when a speaker’s assertion is given unduly low weight simply because the listener is 
prejudiced against the social group to which the speaker belongs, resulting in the latter being treated as 
though he/she lacks the attributes perceived necessary to be a reliable informant (Medina 2011). 
Therefore, Fricker identifies ‘identity power’ as a specific form of social power in operation where 
testimonial exchanges are influenced by identity prejudices. In other words, as Medina (2011: 27) argues, 
testimonial injustice ‘concerns the social imaginary’s role in shaping people’s capacities for listening 
properly and for assigning adequate levels of credibility and authority’. 
 
Fricker’s examples of testimonial injustices centre on the ideology of racial discrimination, which makes it 
more significant to draw on this framework to understand the racialisation of religious identities within 
the asylum system. This is especially important given that categorisations of who is and is not allowed to 
make claims to religious identities are framed within racialised discourse. 
 
The UK Asylum Adjudication System 
 
The general process of seeking asylum in the UK involves lodging a claim, followed by a screening 
interview, to allow officials to establish claimants’ identities. The next step is a substantive interview 
conducted by an immigration caseworker to allow the claimant to give his/her testimony. To be recognised 
as a refugee, an asylum seeker must prove ‘to a reasonable degree of likelihood’ that they have a ‘well-
founded fear of persecution’ for one of the reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion, as specified in the 1951 UN Refugee Convention (Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR] 1998). 
 
In assessing the credibility of an asylum claim, immigration officials are expected to simultaneously 
consider three key criteria of internal consistency, external consistency and plausibility (Thomas 2011). 
Internal consistency hinges on the expectation that a claimant’s oral testimony, written statements and 
any personal documentation submitted as evidence in support of their claim should be ‘coherent and 
reasonably consistent’ (UK Home Office 2015: 15). External consistency relates to the expectation for a 
claimant’s testimony to be consistent with the ‘general known facts’ such as the Country of Origin 
Information (COI) as well as any expert evidence available. Decision-makers are required to make use of 
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‘accurate, impartial and up-to-date country of origin information from a variety of sources’ (UNHCR 2001: 
12). Finally, plausibility refers to the actual assessment of the apparent ‘likelihood’ or ‘truthfulness’ of a 
claim in relation to the internal and external information, and the attached evidence (UK Home Office 
2015). However, as Kagan (2003: 386) argues, the problem with plausibility is that the: ‘assessment may 
also be [wrongly] based upon what is speculated upon or imagined to be likely, rather than upon actual 
evidence of what has occurred or evidence of general conditions that inform the likelihood of an 
occurrence’. 
 
To this end, officials are warned not to base plausibility decisions on their own assumptions, conjecture or 
speculative ideas of what ought to have happened, what they might think ‘someone genuinely fleeing for 
their life’ should have done, what ought to have been possible or not possible or how ‘a genuine refugee’ 
would have behaved, or how they think a third party would have acted in those circumstances (UNHCR 
1998). 
 
However, it is important to note that asylum seekers are a population that frequently experience 
horrendous human rights violations in their countries of origin, and their journeys are often traumatic. To 
this end, UNHCR (1998) guidelines state that asylum seekers are not always able to corroborate every 
aspect of their claims and, as such, the ‘benefit of the doubt’ rule needs to be taken into consideration, 
especially where the applicant’s testimony is found to be generally ‘believable’. In Kagan’s (2003: 382) 
view, the UNHCR’s believability standard implies that ‘to be a refugee, people only need to show that their 
fears of being persecuted are well-founded, rather than needing to show certainty’. This then means that 
‘an adjudicator does not need to be absolutely convinced by an applicant’s testimony, as a jury might need 
to be in a criminal case requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt’ (Kagan 2003: 382). When taken this 
way, the ‘benefit of the doubt’ rule is meant to ensure that genuine refugees are not disadvantaged simply 
because some people abuse the refugee protection system (Kagan 2003). 
 
Yet, in the UK (in common with other liberal democracies), there are pervasive views that the UK Border 
Agency’s (UKBA) decision-making on asylum claims suffers from what is termed as an institutional ‘culture 
of disbelief’ or ‘culture of denial’ (Shaw and Witkin 2004; Gibson 2013; Souter 2011). As Souter (2011: 48) 
argues, this stems from: 
 
the Home Office’s acceptance of the familiar and widespread assumption among politicians 
and the general public that large numbers of asylum claims are unfounded, mendacious or 
‘bogus’, and are made by ‘economic migrants’ as a means of improving their standard of 
living, rather than by ‘genuine’ refugees as defined by the 1951 Refugee Convention. 
 
Therefore, when disbelief becomes a ‘culture’ it means the practice is no longer confined to isolated cases, 
but has permeated the system’s decision-making at large (Souter 2011). Jubany’s ethnographic research 
of the UK asylum determination process, which involved participant observation and interviews with 
immigration officials, offers some useful insight. In her article ‘Constructing Truths in a Culture of 
Disbelief’, Jubany (2011) argues that the UK immigration officials’ work ethic, practices and habits are 
hugely influenced by the negative views they ‘absorb from the social imaginary’ (Medina 2011). As a result, 
officials’ interpretation of refugee protection not only reflects a ‘meta-message of deterrence’ (as guided 
by asylum policies), but is also ‘nearly always slanted towards the disbelief of the narrative and the 
discrediting of the applicant’ (Jubany 2011: 84). Concurrently, this has a knock-on effect on their 
perceptions about ‘truth’, often leading to the development of so-called ‘professional knowledge’ within 
the asylum adjudication system (Fuglerud 2004; Herlihy, Gleeson and Turner 2010; Jubany 2011). 
 
This so-called ‘professional knowledge’, as Jubany (2011: 82–83, emphasis added) argues, evolves from a 
correlation of all cases with what officials consider a ‘normal case’, whose common standards are shared 
by all officers, implying that ‘what officers decide to establish as the group criteria is what is consolidated 
as professional knowledge’. The results of this is that the production of ‘professional knowledge’ involves 
the codification of personal stereotyping as ‘experience’ and ‘expertise’, applied and legitimised by the 
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subculture of disbelief (Jubany 2011). It is within this context that Jubany (2017) stresses the importance 
of examining the asylum adjudication procedures; how this intersect with the practices, habits and socially 
constructed conceptions among officials; as well as the effect of the socio-political environment in which 
decisions are produced and the consequences on the lives of people seeking refuge. 
 
Drawing on empirical evidence, the remainder of this paper addresses the following questions: 
• What challenges do Pakistani Christian asylum seekers encounter in trying to prove their Christian 
identity? 
• What barriers do they face in their efforts to evidence their Christian faith and the persecution they 
suffered in the country of origin as a result of their faith? 
 
Research and Methodology 
 
The article is based on ethnographic research conducted between June and December 2015, using 40 
research participants for interviews, focus groups, participant observations and case file analyses. The 
research aimed to gain understanding of Pakistani Christian experiences, both as victims of religious 
persecution while still in Pakistan and as asylum claimants while seeking protection on religious grounds 
in the UK. Snowball sampling and existing contacts facilitated access to participants. The sample consisted 
of 15 Pakistani Christian asylum seekers and 25 key informants, including migrant support organisations 
(n = 4), vicars and pastors (n = 4), Pakistani Christian community leaders (n = 10) and professionals such 
as legal advisors (n = 3) and immigration judges (n = 2), and those working in interpretation and 
translation (n = 2). Interviews with asylum seekers were conducted in both English and Urdu, using an 
interpreter. As argued by Squires (2009), ‘trustworthiness’ is used to measure a qualitative study’s rigour, 
which also applies to the trustworthiness of interpreters in cross-language qualitative research. In this 
case, the interpreter was a competent and trusted retired Anglican reverend and former missionary to 
Pakistan, with a long history of working with the Pakistani Christian refugee community in the UK. Of the 
15 interviews with asylum seekers, access was gained to six case files (which included interview records 
and UKBA refusal letters, etc.). I also spent time with the research participants, occasionally attending 
social events such as church services and refugee-related community events, organised by the 
organisations that supported them. That said, such high-level of interaction with participants raises ethical 
implications, which I addressed by adopting a reflexive approach and treating consent as an ongoing 
process rather than a one-off negotiation (Madziva 2015). In light of the vulnerable nature of the 
population under study, key ethical issues including confidentiality, informed consent and avoiding harm 
were given high priority, as was the need to avoid unnecessary discomfort. 
 
Therefore, the research design enabled me to gain in-depth knowledge of the Christian claimants’ lived 
experiences of seeking asylum, as well as the UKBA’s responses to asylum seekers’ religious claims. 
Research encounters were audio recorded and transcribed before the analysis using thematic and 
conversational techniques. Themes emerged in the process of coding and analysing data, as opposed to the 
research being theory driven (Charmaz 2006). While the data generated provide rich and important 
insight, the findings cannot be taken to represent all Christian refugees from Muslim majority countries. 
Note also that all names used in this article are pseudonyms to protect participants’ identities. 
 
Evidencing the Christian Identity 
 
As mentioned, when seeking asylum, claimants undergo an initial screening interview in which they are 
required to produce evidence of their identity. While the binary of the good/bad asylum seeker (Malloch 
and Stanley 2005) is prevalent in dominant discourses and underpins the development of what could be 
seen as a ‘structural identity prejudice’ (Fricker 2007: 155), the case of Christians from Muslim majority 
countries points to an extension of this problematic binary to one of the good/bad Christian. 
 
As previously argued (Madziva 2018), Pakistani Christians increasingly suffer ‘identity prejudice’ (Fricker 
2007) in two ways—as asylum seekers and as individuals from a Muslim majority country. This formed a 
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recurring theme in the study with participants who routinely claimed that because of their country of 
origin, immigration officials invariably assumed them to be Muslims—and, hence, potential terrorists. 
Consequently, their claims of being Christians were systematically doubted, with those bearing biblical or 
English names frequently subjected to increased scrutiny. For example, note two participants’ screening 
experiences: 
 
In my screening interview, the caseworker saw my name and he looked at me and because 
of my skin he could tell this man is from Asia but his name is English. So to the caseworker 
my name was inappropriate because it didn’t match people from Pakistan … He said to me, 
‘you can’t be a Christian because you are Muslim, why have you changed your name?’ I told 
him I was born a Christian and that it was [my] great grandfather who converted … As he 
looked at my papers and he could tell my grandfather had an English name, my father had 
an English name. He became a bit settled that I was not a Muslim disguising … a terrorist in 
disguise because the record was there. (Nathaniel, refugee) 
 
My wife and I were not expecting to experience any problems because our names are 
biblical names, so they say … that we were born Christians … but when the official looked at 
our bodies against the names written on our passports, he found our identities 
questionable. We were Christians in Asian bodies, and this didn’t sit well with the official, 
so we were held overnight while they verified our identities in case we were terrorists. 
(Mathew, refugee) 
 
While it is very common for asylum seekers who fail to produce sufficient identity documentation to be 
rejected and/or treated as suspects (Gibson 2013), Pakistani Christians with sufficient identity documents 
were instead judged as counterfeit, as their papers did not match that of a ‘normal case’ (Jubany 2011). 
Therefore, there is some resonance here with Foucault’s (2007) notion of ‘governance through security’, 
which, as he argues, is underpinned by specific problematisations of risks and threats that are connected 
to certain groups of people, as well as particular forms of knowledge. Thus, having been greeted with 
suspicion and distrust upon arrival, participants claimed that their testimonies were subsequently ‘heard 
suspiciously’. 
 
Evidencing the Christian Faith 
 
Those who managed to pass the screening process proceeded to the next stage, which is a substantive 
interview with a caseworker, in which they were given the opportunity to give testimony to the 
persecution they had suffered in Pakistan. Meanwhile, for individuals seeking refugee protection on 
religious grounds, the initial requirement is to demonstrate his/her religious belief before they can prove 
that they suffered persecution due to their Christian identity. To this end, the UK Home Office (2015: 28) 
guidelines on religion make explicit that ‘a simple holding of beliefs which are not tolerated in the country 
of origin will normally not be enough to substantiate a claim to refugee status’. Instead, officials are 
required to ascertain: 
 
whether the claimant genuinely adheres to the religion to which he or she professes to 
belong, how that individual observes those beliefs in the private and public spheres, and 
whether that would place him/her at risk of persecution (28). 
 
While all asylum seekers struggle due to the ‘burden of proof’ (Sweeney 2009), I argue that the 
adjudication of faith-based claims is made more complex by the fact that it brings ‘secular adjudication 
into the world of faith’ (Kagan 2010: 1189). Yet, faith is an aspect that is not objectively verifiable. This 
further raises questions regarding the competence of immigration officials in religious matters or the 
extent to which they are qualified to assess the genuineness of an individual’s beliefs. Indeed, this includes 
the manner in which they are practised in different socio-political and religious contexts (Madziva and 
Lowndes 2018). To this end, Kagan (2010: 1189) stresses the need to pay attention to officials’ questioning 
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styles, as this is a key aspect of testimonial exchanges that reflect adjudicators’ religious knowledge and 
assumptions, and the asymmetric power relations (Fricker 2007) in the asylum adjudication system. 
 
In this study, participants raised concern that in their efforts to assess individuals’ ‘genuine adherence’ to 
the Christian faith, immigration officials routinely expected claimants to respond to a quiz-like style of 
questioning, which frequently ran afoul of the narrative norms, practices and central focus and/or key 
aspects of the Christian faith. Minor inconsistencies, such as the inability to recall the names of or recite 
the books of the bible in their rightful order, were often taken by adjudicators as evidence of an applicant’s 
lack of credibility. Thus, participants routinely noted how they were asked ‘to recite the books of the bible’ 
(George) or were questioned on how they ‘celebrate Christmas and Easter’ (Tariq), or even asked ‘which 
one is more important, Christmas or Easter?’ (Aisha). The major challenge imposed by such an approach 
to credibility assessment is that decisions about the truthfulness of asylum seekers’ testimonies are not 
only undertaken on the basis of what the individuals say, but also on how they say it (see Fricker 2007). 
As one senior legal advisor, Angie, noted: 
 
the worst question I’ve ever heard asked … is ‘which one’s more important, Christmas or 
Easter?’ And when the claimant said, ‘well, Easter, of course; it’s the resurrection’, he 
[immigration officer] was, ‘well, no, it’s wrong, it’s Christmas because that’s when 
everybody gets presents’. 
 
Thus, Christian asylum applicants are expected to conform to secular and Western stereotypes and 
understandings of Christianity to be considered genuine candidates for asylum. To this end, key 
informants, particularly pastors and vicars, found the Home Office’s knowledge-based approach extremely 
disturbing, in that it prioritises issues that are peripheral to the Christian faith. A female vicar (from the 
Church of England), Allison, argued how Christianity is very different from other types of faiths, in which 
it is all very fact-related: 
 
Christianity isn’t just an event which is learned and memorised: it is a way of life. If you’re 
a Muslim, if you’re a Jew, there will be certain things you have to do, and so it becomes off 
rote, whereas in the Christian world there isn’t a universal way of celebrating Christmas or 
Easter. And for true Christians, both Christmas and Easter are important in their unique 
ways: Christmas is the birth of Christ and Easter represents Christ’s resurrection, which is 
the central issue in Christianity, if you like. Overall, as Christians, what we emphasise is a 
relationship with Christ. So you cannot put the same parameters on that as you could for 
other types of faith. 
 
An outstanding case in this study involved a young man, Rusul, who claimed asylum on arrival in 2007. 
The Home Office subsequently found him not to be Christian enough simply because he did not know the 
name of the Pope. As Rusul explained: 
 
in my interview I was asked, ‘what is your denomination’, and I said, ‘I am a Catholic’, and 
the caseworker asked me, ‘who is the Pope’? I now know that it was Pope Benedict but then 
I didn’t know him. So I said I don’t know him. 
 
As reflected in the Home Office refusal letter, not knowing the name of the Pope was taken to be indicative 
of a disingenuous claim: 
 
I do not believe that the claimant is a Christian or has any sort of religious profile in Pakistan 
… He is not a regular attendee at mass, because he did not know the name of the Pope, or 
the correct name of the head of the Roman Catholic Church in Pakistan. 
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Following my interview with Rusul, I spoke to a senior immigration advisor, Debbie, to seek clarification, 
particularly why not knowing the name of the Pope could raise an alarm in terms of credibility within the 
asylum adjudication system.  As Debbie explained: 
 
That one would raise a question mark in terms of credibility because of the position the 
Pope holds in the Catholic Church. I think the justification is that there’d be a major 
difference between asking an Anglican person who the archbishop is and asking a Catholic 
who the Pope is. Because there is the veneration of the Pope, which stands in the episodic 
tradition, and he is directly descended from St Peter—he’s it! So if a Catholic wouldn’t know 
who the Pope was, it would raise worries, that one, according to our guidelines. 
 
Here, we can witness the racialisation and hierarchisation of religion and/or religious knowledge in ways 
that, arguably, point to an extension of the problematic (and oversimplified) binary of the good/bad 
refugee to one of the good/bad Catholic/Christian. Indeed, it is evident that by asking Rusul who the Pope 
was, the adjudicator was acting on the presumed assertion that possessing this knowledge, or lack of it, 
was indicative of something significant in terms of credibility. Subsequently, the claimant’s lack of such 
knowledge was used as evidence that he was ‘not a regular attendee at mass’, and, hence, was not a genuine 
Catholic. In line with Fricker’s notion of credibility deficit in testimonial exchanges, Kagan (2010: 1193) 
argues that analysis of the questions that immigration officials frequently ask reveals what they 
preconceive ‘to be true before encountering the applicant’s actual testimony’. In doing so, ‘adjudicators’ 
assumptions will surface and impact refugee adjudications long before the final judgment on the 
application and before the applicant even answers’ (Kagan 2010: 1192). Thus, as Fricker (2007) rightly 
asserts, credibility appraisals are most likely affected by epistemic agents’ preconceptions, sometimes in 
ways that make it plausibly obvious that some form of ‘identity power’ is at work. 
 
Meanwhile, Rusul claimed that the system did not take into consideration that he was illiterate: 
 
My biggest challenge is I am not educated. As a village boy I knew who my local leaders 
were, and in saying our prayers we would always say them ‘in the name of the Pope’, but to 
get to know … the name of the Pope was out of my reach. 
 
Information gained from the organisation supporting Rusul not only confirmed his being illiterate, but also 
revealed that his case was made more complex by a perceived ‘mix-match’ between his name and those of 
his parents. Hence, he did not comply with the ‘normal case’ (Jubany 2017): 
 
This young man is very illiterate … Also there was a problem with his identity … On his 
identification documents his first name is Muslim-sounding, but his surname is an English 
Christian name and both his parents’ first names are English. This confused the officials. 
One is tempted to say he was denied because both his identity and faith were found 
questionable. (Martin, volunteer) 
 
Commenting from a law perspective, Millbank (2012: 4) argues that: 
 
unlike disbelief of other aspects of a claimant’s narrative (such as past persecution, where 
future fear of persecution may still be made out), disbelief regarding actual group 
membership will almost always doom the claim to failure. 
 
While it is not implied that asylum seekers are always truthful about their religious identities, what is 
argued here is that adjudicators need to pay particular attention to individuals’ backgrounds, including 
level of education and mental capacity. As Kagan (2010) argues, there is need for the asylum system to 
adopt a narrative approach in which adjudicators ask neutral questions, allowing claimants to freely 
provide their own accounts of how they practice their religion. Here, the argument is that narrative 
questions can better accommodate individuals from diverse backgrounds with a wide range of education 
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and experience, without prejudging what a genuine Christian would know or believe. In doing so, 
adjudicators will be able to reach an informed decision about a claimant’s credibility without expecting an 
unrealistic level of specialist knowledge (see Evangelical Alliance UK 2007 in the context of apostasy). 
 
However, as Schuster (2010) argues, challenges such as the ones raised in this paper need to be 
understood within the context of the shift occurring in the broader European asylum regime, which has 
seen States increasingly enacting policies and practices that promote discrimination and unequal 
treatment of asylum seekers, as well as the application of common-sense assertions in the adjudication of 
asylum claims. Thus, necessitating the intersection of racism in a complex way with other factors such as 
class, leading to the creation of a hierarchy of the excluded. Evident, then, in this research is a pattern in 
which applicants were increasingly denied refugee status on the grounds that officials were not convinced 
that they had a ‘religious profile’ in Pakistan. 
 
Evidencing Religious Persecution 
 
In assessing credibility, immigration officials are required to judge claimants’ life stories in conjunction 
with external evidence or the general known facts, particularly the COI. As the UK Home Office (2015: 15) 
states, ‘the greater the correlation between aspects of the account and external evidence, the greater the 
weight caseworkers should attribute to those aspects’. Emphasis on the correlation between personal 
testimony and external evidence, arguably, invites debate on the extent to which objective facts such as 
the COI are used to judge the credibility of claimants’ subjective evidence and the effect on individuals’ 
ability to win refugee status (see also Thomas 2011 for a detailed discussion). As argued elsewhere 
(Madziva and Lowndes 2018:83): ‘for external evidence to be effectively used to support personal 
experience, it needs to properly reflect knowledge and expertise about the practical situation on the 
ground in the country of origin’. 
 
Hence, this section seeks to highlight what could be viewed as inconsistencies in the current Home Office 
guidelines on Pakistan as they relate to Christians. 
 
The recently amended UK Home Office (2018: 5, 7) ‘Country Information and Guidance Pakistan: 
Christians and Christian Converts’, published September 2018, notes that while: 
 
Christians in Pakistan are a religious minority who, in general, suffer discrimination … this 
is not sufficient to amount to a real risk of persecution … [as] Christians in general are 
permitted to practise their faith, can attend church, participate in religious activities and 
have their own schools and hospitals. 
 
While there is now acknowledgment that ‘both evangelical and non-evangelical Christians face 
discrimination and violence because of their faith’ (UK Home Office 2018: 8), we can observe the 
hierarchisation of faith in law, as evangelical Christians are believed to be more susceptible to persecution: 
 
Evangelism by its very nature involves some obligation to proselytise. Someone who seeks 
to broadcast their faith to strangers so as to encourage them to convert, may find 
themselves facing a charge of blasphemy. In that way, evangelical Christians face a greater 
risk than those Christians who are not publicly active. It will be for the [judicial fact-finder] 
to assess on a case by case basis whether, notwithstanding attendance at an evangelical 
church, it is important to the individual to behave in evangelical ways that may lead to a real 
risk of persecution (UK Home Office 2018: 5). 
 
In this regard, evangelical Christians are viewed as more likely to be victims of blasphemy laws: 
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Evangelising Christians may find themselves particularly affected by the blasphemy laws, 
which carry severe penalties, and may be able to demonstrate that use of the blasphemy 
laws against them while practising their religion could amount to persecution (8). 
 
The COI document goes further to make a (problematic) distinction between Christian converts and those 
born into the religion, stating that ‘the situation is far more difficult for a person who is known to have 
converted from Islam to Christianity, than for a person who was born Christian’ (UK Home Office 2018: 
10). However, participants’ accounts of persecution suggest that the distinctions of evangelical and non-
evangelical and between Christian converts and Christian born are not at all clear-cut, especially when the 
context in which people experience persecution and the manner in which Christian life is lived are taken 
into consideration. 
 
A good example here is Zaida, a female claimant who applied for asylum in 2014 and whose case raises 
important questions of what constitutes a ‘religious profile’, or what should be classified as ‘evangelism’. 
Narrating her story, Zaida said: 
 
I was a teacher in a Muslim school. One day I was fasting because it was Christian Lent … At 
break time, I was sitting in the staffroom reading a Christian magazine and one Muslim lady 
teacher … offered me food and I refused. She persuaded me thinking I had no food to eat 
and eventually I said, ‘no, I am fasting’. She then requested to see my magazine, and later 
asked if she could keep it and read later, to which I agreed. 
 
As Zaida further claims, the same teacher returned the following day and asked more questions about 
Christianity, to which she was very happy to elaborate. In the afternoon, this same teacher observed Zaida 
leading her class into their lunchtime prayer (as per the school tradition). Following this, she went to 
report to the head teacher that Zaida had been talking to her about Christianity with the intention to 
convert her, and that she also observed her teaching students in her class to say prayers in a Christian way. 
She also presented the Christian magazine as evidence of the claimant’s ‘evangelical’ behaviour. As Zaida 
further claims, she subsequently lost her job and was publicly assaulted by the teacher’s family, after which 
a blasphemy case was filed against her. 
 
However, the Home Office rejected Zaida’s application for asylum. Among other things, the officer who 
wrote her refusal letter stated: 
 
I did not find the claimant’s account of what happened in the school credible … she did not 
have any religious profile … Your previous history shows you can in general live as a 
Christian born without problems in Pakistan. 
 
This case, like many others I have listened to, aptly demonstrates that one does not need to be an evangelist 
in Western terms to attract persecution. Although the Home Office judged the claimant not to be an 
evangelist, it was a combination of religious observable acts—‘fasting’, passing on a ‘Christian magazine’ 
and a particular way of ‘praying’—which framed Zaida as ‘someone who seeks to broadcast their faith to 
strangers so as to encourage them to convert’ (UK Home Office 2018: 5). To this end, I strongly argue that 
adjudicators need to employ what Kagan (2010: 1222) calls ‘the eyes of the persecutor test’. 
 
Kagan (2010: 1222–1223) further argues: 
 
the eyes of the persecutor test guides credibility assessment … toward observable and 
objective factors, which are more comfortable grounds for adjudication. Agents of 
persecution are no more capable than adjudicators of knowing what a person genuinely 
believes or does not believe. Instead, persecution is triggered by the associations and 
observable behaviors that lead the persecutor to perceive that the victim is a member of the 
targeted group. 
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Here, it is clear that the Home Office fails to recognise that in the Muslim majority world, unlike the 
situation in liberal democracies, ‘faith, as it informs identity, permeates and is exhibited in all aspects of 
individual and communal life’ (Thane, Jhans and Rehman 2016: 12). 
 
Similar sentiments were also echoed by the female vicar, Allison: 
 
I guess, in Britain, religion is a convenient thing: Christianity could suit, certainly, places like 
the Church of England where it’s a good place to be married, baptised or hold funerals. 
Whereas in the Muslim majority world, you can’t strategise things, hide or exercise your 
faith as and when it’s convenient because it is your life and identity—you are defined by it. 
 
Closely related to this is a scenario that reflects what could be seen as the immigration officials’ ‘refusal 
mindset’, especially when dealing with claimants whose lived experiences were perceived to be ‘far 
removed from the cultural, psychological, emotional, and narrative norm of the adjudicator’ (Kagan 2010: 
1190). Here I return to the case of Rusul, who, as mentioned, was found not to be Catholic enough because 
he did not know the name of the Pope. His actual asylum claim was based on accusations of blasphemy, as 
focused by an Islamic military group. According to Rusul, this was a strategy to take his father’s land away 
from the family. Explaining how he became implicated, Rusul said: 
 
my father is a devout Roman Catholic leader who was accused of terrorism in 2006. 
Following his imprisonment, his accusers tried to force me, as the eldest son, to put my 
thumbprint on the paper, which signs the land over to them on behalf of my father … With 
the support of community leaders and a lawyer who knew my father very well, I refused … 
Then one day, as I was coming from the city, I saw someone making a fire on the roadside 
… I asked if I could warm myself, as it was very cold… As I was warming myself, two men 
came to me and said, ‘you are burning pages of the Quran’. 
 
While it is acknowledged in the COI document that in Pakistan accusations of blasphemy are a common 
avenue through which Christians are persecuted and displaced from their land and properties, Rusul’s 
claim was found to be overwhelmingly implausible. As stated in the Home Office refusal letter: 
 
in relation to the incident in 2006 in which you are allegedly accused of burning the Koran, 
your account was rejected in its entirety … I do not believe that the incident occurred as 
claimed. Even an uneducated person would not burn pages of this sort knowingly … The 
idea of a person sitting alone on the roadside calmingly burning pages in this way stretches 
credulity … The whole incident and its supporting documentation simply does not add up. 
In conclusion, I find no basis for the claimant to have any fears arising from his family’s 
Christianity. 
 
This excerpt raises a number of serious issues. First, the remark that, ‘I do not believe that the incident 
occurred as claimed … even an uneducated person would not burn pages of this sort knowingly’, 
demonstrates how the information that a claimant provides is often used in a very selective and prejudicial 
manner to justify the reasons for refusal. Here, the claimant’s illiteracy is used in a stigmatised and 
stereotypical way to substantiate the assertion of a false and illogical claim, rather than as evidence for 
reasoning why he did not know the name of the Pope (as discussed earlier). Here, we can see, as Fricker 
(2007: 1) so persuasively argues, that testimonial injustice is most likely to occur ‘when prejudice causes 
a hearer to give a deflated level of credibility to a speaker’s word’. 
 
Second, while the immigration official found ‘no basis for the claimant to have any fears arising from his 
family’s Christianity’, what he failed to take into consideration was the fact that, in the Pakistani context, 
the claimant was publicly defined by his family’s Catholic identity, which, as he explained, was the trigger 
of persecution. When viewed in line with Kagan’s ‘eyes of the persecutor test’ thesis, the adjudicator 
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needed to have understood that the family’s Christian identity was enough to trigger persecution, even if 
it remained possible that Rusul was less than sincere in his adherence. 
 
Finally, is the problematic statement, ‘the idea of a person sitting alone on the roadside calmingly burning 
pages in this way stretches credulity’, which clearly demonstrates that decision-makers often expect 
accusations of blasphemy to make sense. As Herlihy, Gleeson and Turner (2010) argue, what officials often 
fail to understand is that persecutors are not always logical thinkers; increasingly, they come up with 
anything, no matter how odd, to achieve their motives. In this regard, officials’ stereotypical views and 
subjective understandings of human behaviour represents only a ‘partial view of the world’, which 
overlooks the reality that there are ‘certain experiences that they just cannot all have, and some that they 
cannot even imagine. In these realms their otherwise useful stereotypes are insufficient’ (Goodman, 
Sirriyeh and McMahon 2017; Herlihy, Gleeson and Turner 2010: 364). 
 
Meanwhile, existing research has shown that to justify the prejudices and stereotypical judgements of 
those seeking asylum, adjudicators increasingly hide behind the language of ‘intuitive feeling’ (Jubany 
2011) or ‘ring of truth’ (Millbank 2009). By making such claims, adjudicators position: 
 
the story itself as the active agent in the adjudication process and suggests that its truth is 
both self-contained and self-evident … rather than the decision-maker who is choosing … to 
believe, or to disbelieve, in it or the person telling it. (Millbank 2009: 5) 
 
Thus, as Lewis (2014) argues, understandings of credibility in the asylum adjudication process need to 
shift away from the idea of ‘discovering truth’ to holding adjudicators accountable for making decisions in 
the face of ‘empirical uncertainty’. The argument here is that instead of treating the evidence, experiences 
and stories that asylum seekers put across as something that speaks for itself, adjudicators need to ask 
themselves why they find particular accounts unbelievable. This will require them to engage in a more 
critical and self-reflexive adjudication process, including interrogating themselves in the same manner in 




The article takes inspiration from Miranda Fricker’s philosophical work on epistemic injustices, 
hermeneutical and testimonial, to help tease out the religious discrimination that Pakistani Christian 
asylum seekers experienced within the context of the UK asylum adjudication system. In doing so, the 
article’s contribution is threefold. First, its theoretical underpinnings provide the framework for not only 
exploring how religion is assessed and evaluated, but can be effectively applied to evaluate credibility 
challenges pertaining to asylum seekers in general in the UK, as in other liberal democracies. Indeed, 
asylum applicants from other countries and regions are similarly involved in protracted and complex 
struggles to secure refugee status, and often their stories and lived experiences are judged in a prejudicial 
manner. Second, the article highlights weaknesses in the adjudication of asylum claims and decision-
making processes, and the inherent built-in obstacles that people in the asylum process face—in turn, 
exposing the challenges to evidence-based approaches to the determination of refugee status. Third, the 
article’s focus on religion does extend existing knowledge in the area. It demonstrates that the adjudication 
of faith-based claims is a complex process that brings secular adjudicators into the world of faith, with the 
data presented pointing to the incompetencies of adjudicators in religious matters. Therefore, it is clear 
that while the Home Office places great emphasis on issues of coherency and consistency, claimants’ 
experiences also point towards its own inconsistency and incoherency. Overall, this article adds to the 
many calls by academics for adjudicators to engage in a more critical and self-reflexive adjudication 
process, rather than basing their decisions to grant asylum upon a set of tacit assumptions, while rejecting 
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1 Guentner et al. (2016) defines bordering practices as measures taken by State institutions—whether at territorial frontiers or 
inside them—which demarcate categories of people so as to incorporate some and exclude others, in a specific social order. 
2 According to Taylor (2002: 106) ‘imaginaries are neither strictly ideas nor strictly institutions’. Rather, they are ‘schematized 
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